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NOTES
PUTTING THE GLEE CLUB TO THE TEST:
RECONSIDERING MANDATORY SUSPICIONLESS
DRUG TESTING OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
Tamara A. Dugan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, in the case of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,' the United
States Supreme Court held that suspicionless drug testing of public school stu-
dents seeking to participate in extracurricular athletic activities was constitu-
tional. While the Court had previously upheld suspicionless drug testing of rail-
road personnel involved in train accidents 2 and similar testing of federal cus-
toms agents that carry weapons or are involved in drug interdiction,3 Vernonia
was the Court's first consideration of the constitutionality of suspicionless drug
testing of students in public schools.4
After the ruling in Vernonia, various state legislatures considered proposals
intended to encourage not only the testing of student athletes, but also to support
drug testing as a prerequisite for participation in any public school extracurricu-
lar activity in their state.5 While none of these legislative proposals ultimately
became law, local school boards in several states took the initiative to institute
* Candidate for J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2003; A.B., Princeton University, 2000. This
Note is dedicated to my parents and friends, who always encouraged me to keep going in every-
thing that I did. I would like to thank Michael Shannon for all his helpful comments and edits
throughout the process of writing my Note.
1. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
2. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
3. Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
4. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1270 (2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509
(2001).
5. Between 1995, the year of the Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia, and 2000, the legisla-
tures of Hawaii, New Jersey, Iowa, Georgia, and Montana all considered bills that would have
explicitly permitted school boards within their state to conduct suspicionless drug testing of stu-
dents participating in extracurricular activities. See H.B. 2853, 18th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1995);
A.B. 2727, 208th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 1998); S.F. 87, 78th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1999);
H.F. 499, 78th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Iowa 1999); H.B. 993, 145th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga.
1999); H.B. 81, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2000).
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similar suspicionless drug testing programs at the district level.6 Many of the
policies adopted by these school boards have raised new constitutional ques-
tions. Although the Supreme Court's ruling in Vernonia made it apparent that
the testing of student athletes was constitutionally permissible under certain
circumstances, it remains unclear whether the Court's ruling extends to the test-
ing of students that desire to join non-athletic extracurricular clubs or activities
such as the glee club, academic clubs, or the Future Farmers of America.
District-level attempts to implement suspicionless drug testing as a prereq-
uisite for extracurricular involvement have already faced numerous constitu-
tional challenges--challenges that have produced divergent results within the
federal judiciary. Following a recent Tenth Circuit decision striking down suspi-
cionless testing of extracurricular participants, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to consider the matter further. 7 Assuming that the Court reaches the mer-
6. School boards in Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
and Texas have approved suspicionless drug testing of students that are participating in extracur-
ricular activities. See Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding the drug testing
policy of Cave City, Arkansas public schools that imposes random drug tests on all students in the
district, with the penalty for a positive test being suspension from extracurricular activities), va-
cated as moot by No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999); Trinidad
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998) (striking down the drug testing policy of
the Trinidad, Colorado school district that mandated drug testing for all students participating in
extracurricular activities); Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding the
policy of the Rush County, Indiana! School Board that requires drug testing of all students partici-
pating in any extracurricular activity); Chris Gray, Morial Pushes New Drug-Test Policy: City to
Finance Pilot Program, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 23, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 26198416
(detailing drug testing, including random testing of students participating in extracurricular activi-
ties, in New Orleans schools); David Hench, Painkiller Abuse Racks Rural County; Washington
County Struggles in Vicious Cycle: A Bleak Economy Fosters Drug Use, Which in Turn Appears
to Impede Growth, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 3, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WL 6491134
(stating that the Calais school board in Maine has instituted random drug testing for all students,
with the penalty for testing positive being that the student is barred from participating in extracur-
ricular activities); Jeffrey Gold, Judge Bars Random Drug Test at High School Points to Privacy
Violation for Athletes, Clubmembers, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Jan. 5, 2001, at A3, avail-
able at 2001 WL 5232333 (noting that Hunterdon Central Regional High School in Flemington,
New Jersey conducted random drug tests of students on teams or in clubs-and even those who
parked their cars at school-until a New Jersey Superior Court Judge issued an injunction prohib-
iting the continuation of the policy); Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (ruling
that the policy of the Tecumseh, Oklahoma school district requiring drug testing of all students
who participate in any extracurricular activity is unconstitutional), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509
(2001); Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:97-CV-020-J, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20253
(N.D. Tex. Dec 7, 2000) (holding that the policy of the Tulia, Texas school district to conduct
drug testing of all students in grades seven through twelve who engage in extracurricular activities
is unconstitutional). Public schools in Florida, Idaho, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming have also initiated drug testing programs of one form or another. Amanda E.
Bishop, Note, Students, Urinalysis & Extracurricular Activities: How Vernonia's Aftermath Is
Trampling Fourth Amendment Rights, 10 HEALTH MATRIx 217, 218-19 (2000).
7. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001).
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its of the challenge presented in Board of Education v. Earls, there may soon be
constitutional guidance on the issue upon which this Note focuses.
In the meantime, this Note offers a proposal for resolution of the suspi-
cionless drug testing question. Part ii discusses the constitutional requirements
for suspicionless drug testing by explaining (a) the Supreme Court's ruling in
Vernonia, (b) the divergent answers provided by the federal circuits to the ques-
tion of whether Vernonia stands for the constitutionality of testing students who
participate in non-athletic extracurricular activities, and (c) the Supreme Court's
ruling in Chandler v. Miller-wherein, two years after Vernonia, the Court held
that suspicionless drug testing of political candidates is unconstitutional. 8 Ex-
panding upon the arguments presented in Part II, Part III explains that suspi-
cionless drug testing of public school students who wish to participate in extra-
curricular activities is problematic-from both constitutional and policy-based
standpoints. The Supreme Court may remedy these problems with its upcoming
decision in the Earls case; if the Court declines to do so, however, this Note
suggests that state legislatures should step in to alter the suspicionless drug test-
ing procedures currently employed in certain public schools.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution-applicable to
searches and seizures conducted by state officials by virtue of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 9 -protects "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. ... "' It further provides that the warrants often neces-
sary to validate those seizures cannot be issued without "probable cause" and
must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."" According to one casebook on constitutional law, "[ulnder the
monolithic approach to the Fourth Amendment which once obtained, the as-
sumption was that every form of activity which constituted either a search or a
seizure had to be grounded in the same quantum of evidence suggested by the
Amendment's 'probable cause' requirement.' 2 As more recent cases-such as
8. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
9. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (citing Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)). In New Jersey v. T.L 0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), for example, the Su-
preme Court applied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the search of a public school
student by school officials who suspected that the student had violated school rules. WiLtAm B.
LOCKHART ET AL., THE AMEInCAN CoNsTrTUmoN: CAsES-CoMMENTs-QuFsTIONs 328 (8th ed.
1996).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. Id.
12. LoCKHART ET AL., supra note 9, at 314.
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Camara v. Municipal Courtt 3-would suggest, however, courts do not always
take such a mechanical approach in cases that touch upon Fourth Amendment
rights. 14 In fact, "[tihe Supreme Court and the lower courts have upheld a rather
broad range of administrative inspections and so-called regulatory searches even
when conducted without a warrant and without the traditional quantum of prob-
able cause.' 15 The Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia exemplifies this fact.
A. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton: Upholding Suspicionless Drug Test-
ing for Public School Athletes
1. Facts
At issue in Vernonia was the constitutionality of the Student Athlete Drug
Policy adopted by School District 47J in Vernonia, Oregon.16 That policy au-
thorized random urinalysis drug testing of students who chose to participate in
the District's athletics program 7 and, in certain instances, directed school offi-
cials to suspend the eligibility of those athletes whose tests yielded positive re-
sults. 18 After James Acton, a seventh grader, refused to submit to the required
13. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (ruling that probable cause exists to conduct
housing inspections if reasonable administrative or legislative standards for inspecting an area are
satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling and further explaining that warrants to conduct such
inspections should normally be sought only after entry is refused by the homeowner-unless there
has been a citizen complaint or there is another satisfactory reason for securing the area immedi-
ately).
14. L cKHART ET AL., supra note 9, at 314 ("At least some Fourth Amendment activity should
be judged under a balancing test, that is, by 'balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails."').
15. Id. at 328.
16. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
17. Id. Under the dictates of the Vernonia policy:
Students wishing to play sports must sign a form consenting to the testing and must ob-
tain the written consent of their parents. Athletes are tested at the beginning of each
season for their sport. In addition, once each week of the season the names of the ath-
letes are placed in a "pool" from which a student, with the supervision of two adults,
blindly draws the names of 10% of the athletes for random testing.
Id. at 650.
18. Id. at 651. Justice Scalia explained the disciplinary process for policy violations as follows:
If a sample tests positive, a second test is administered as soon as possible to confirm
the result. If the second test is negative, no further action is taken. If the second test is
positive, the athlete's parents are notified, and the school principal convenes a meeting
with the student and his parents, at which the student is given the option of (1) partici-
pating for six weeks in an assistance program that includes weekly urinalysis, or (2)
suffering suspension from athletics for the remainder of the current season and the next
[Vol. 28
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testing, the District declined to let him participate in its football program.' 9 Ac-
ton and his parents responded by filing suit in federal district court, seeking a
judicial declaration that the Policy violated the U.S. Constitution and an injunc-
tion against further enforcement of the suspicionless testing regime.2° The dis-
trict court dismissed the action, but was later reversed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that the Policy violated the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.2'
2. Fourth Amendment Background and the Special Needs Exception
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court had to consider whether the
Vernonia testing policy comported with Fourth Amendment requirements. 22 At
the outset of the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia noted that, according to the text
of the Fourth Amendment, "the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a
governmental search is 'reasonableness. ' 23 In the law enforcement context, the
Court went on to explain, "reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a
judicial warrant"--this, in turn, necessitates a showing of probable cause.2 Not
every search and seizure requires a warrant or a demonstration of probable
cause, however.25
According to the Court, "[a] search unsupported by probable cause can be
constitutional . . . 'when special needs, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement, make the warrant requirement and probable-cause requirement im-
practicable. '"'26 Recognizing that it had, in an earlier case, "found such 'special
athletic season. The student is then retested prior to the start of the next athletic season
for which he or she is eligible. The Policy states that a second offense results in auto-
matic imposition of option (2); a third offense in suspension for the remainder of the
current season and the next two athletic seasons.
Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 652. The court of appeals also determined that the testing policy of District 47J vio-
lated Article I, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution. Id.
22. At the outset of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia established that the Vernonia policy
did, in fact, raise a Fourth Amendment question. Id. (relying upon the Court's previous ruling in
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989), which said that state-
compelled collection and testing of urine constituted a search that was subject to Fourth Amend-
ment requirements).
23. Id. Whether a search is reasonable, Justice Scalia wrote, "'is judged by balancing its intru-
sion against its promotion of legitimate government interests."' Id. at 652-53 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 653 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
25. Id. ("[A] warrant is not required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches;
and when a warrant is not required.. ., probable cause is not invariably required either.").
26. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
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needs' to exist in the public school context,"27 the Court declined to invalidate
the Vernonia policy simply because it permitted school officials to obtain urine
specimens from student athletes without a warrant and without any showing that
probable cause to conduct the testing existed.28 Instead, the Court went on to
consider whether the type of testing at issue would survive a three-factor balanc-
ing test.
3. The Vernonia Balancing Test
As the Court had previously recognized in Camara, some searches should
be judged by "'balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails.' 29 In Vernonia, the Court would examine the reasonableness of
the suspicionless drug testing policy at issue in light of three related factors: (a)
the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intruded, (b) the charac-
ter of the complained-of intrusion, and (c) the severity of the need met by the
search. 30
a. The nature of the privacy interest at stake
The first factor that the Supreme Court considered in determining whether
the Vernonia drug test was reasonable-and thus constitutional-was the nature
of the students' privacy interest upon which the test infringed.3' In analyzing the
27. Id. Justice Scalia explained why special needs exist in the public school context as follows:
[l]n the public school context . . . the warrant requirement "would unduly interfere
with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures [that arel
needed," and "strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable
cause" would undercut "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom
to maintain order in their schools."
Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.LO, 469 U.S. 325, 340, 341 (1985)).
28. See id.
29. LocKHARTET AL, supra note 9, at 314 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537
(1967)); supra note 15. According to the Vernonia Court:
At least in a case such as this, where there was no clear practice, either approving or
disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the [Fourth Amendment] was en-
acted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by bal-
ancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promo-
tion of legitimate governmental interests.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
30. See generally id. at 654-65.
31. Id. at 654. According to the Court:
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privacy interest at stake, the Court placed great weight upon the persons who
were the subject of the testing policy-namely, children who "ha[d] been com-
mitted to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster. '32 Given that chil-dren who attend public school are required to submit to mandatory physical ex-
ams and vaccinations as a condition of enrollment in school, Justice Scalia rea-
soned, "'students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of
privacy than members of the population generally.' ,,
33
In completing its review of the privacy interest infringed by the testing pol-
icy, the Court then considered the specific subset of the student population that
was affected by the Vernonia test-athletes. According to the Court, the expec-
tation of privacy maintained by student athletes is even less substantial than that
of most other public school students. 34 Justice Scalia explained that the defining
characteristics of interscholastic athletics-engaging in communal showering
and dressing, undergoing a physical exam as a condition of team participation,
obtaining proper insurance coverage, maintaining a minimum grade point aver-
age, and submitting to athletic training at the direction of a coach or athletic
director-suggested that "students who voluntarily participate in school athletics
have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy. ,35 Having determined that student athletes possessed a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy, the Court moved on to consider the second factor in its
reasonableness test.36
b. The character of the intrusion
The Court next examined the "character of the intrusion" resulting from the
testing regime at issue.37 Pursuant to the Vernonia policy, student athletes were
The Fourth Amendment does not protect all subjective expectations of privacy, but
only those that society recognizes as "legitimate." What expectations are legitimate
varies, of course, with context, depending, for example, upon whether the individual
asserting the privacy interest is at home, at work, in a car, or in a public park. In addi-
tion, the legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis h-vis the State may depend
upon the individual's legal relationship with the State.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
32. Id. The Court noted that, "Fourth Amendment rights ... are different in public schools than
elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary re-
sponsibility for children." Id. at 656.
33. Id. at 657 (quoting New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concur-
ring)).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 658.
37. Id.
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required to produce a urine sample in a restroom while being monitored by a
member of the same sex. 8 In addition, students had to provide--prior to submit-
ting a sample for testing-notice of the prescription medications that they were
taking.39 Test results were "disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel
who [had] a need to know . . . and [were] not turned over to law enforcement
authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function."40 While the Court did
find that the medication disclosure requirement raised some cause for concern,4'
the majority ultimately concluded that the invasion of privacy wrought by the
testing and disclosure requirements "was not significant."42 This was so, the
Court reasoned, because the conditions surrounding the production of urine
samples were "nearly identical to those typically encountered in public rest-
rooms, which men, women, and especially school children use daily."43 Fur-
thermore, Justice Scalia wrote, the Court had "never indicated that requiring
advance disclosure of medications is per se unreasonable."": After finding little
cause to worry about the minor intrusions that might accompany the Vernonia
policy, the Court turned its attention to the third and final aspect of its reason-
ableness criteria.
c. The severity of the need met by the search
The final factor of the Court's analysis into the reasonableness of the
Vernonia testing program focused on "the nature and immediacy of the govern-
mental concern at issue... and the efficacy of [the chosen] means for meeting
it."45 This factor included three related elements, which the majority opinion
addressed in succession: (i) the nature of the government's interest, (ii) the im-
mediacy of that interest, and (iii) the effectiveness of the government's re-
sponse.4
i. Nature of the state's interest
Justice Scalia dealt first with the nature of the state's interest in deterring
drug use amongst student athletes. Previous decisions upholding suspicionless
drug testing in other contexts had spoken of the "compelling state interest[s]"
38. Id.
39. Id. at 660.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 659.
42. Id. at 660.
43. Id. at 658.
44. Id. at 659.
45. Id. at 660.
46. See id. at 660-63.
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that justified the policies at issue, but the Vernonia Court was quick to point out
that there was "no fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern" that
would automatically make a particular search compelling-let alone reason-
able 47 According to Justice Scalia, to be compelling, a gover-unental interest
must only be "important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light
of other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine
expectation of privacy.
'
"8
The Court found the interest safeguarded by the Vernonia policy to be suf-
ficiently important-if not compelling-for a number of reasons. First, Justice
Scalia wrote, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is at least as
important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the
importation of drugs... or deterring drug use by engineers and trainmen," both
of which the Court had previously, considered to be compelling interests. 49 Sec-
ond, "the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but
upon the student body and faculty," all the while disrupting the education proc-
ess." Third, in the eyes of the Court, the state had a "special responsibility for
the care and direction" of children.51 Fourth-and perhaps most importantly52 -
the Court noted that the Vernonia policy targeted students who were particularly
vulnerable to the deleterious effects of drug use. According to Justice Scalia, "it
must not be lost sight of that this program is directed ... narrowly to drug use
by school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug user
or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high.,
53
ii. Immediacy of the concern
Having found Vernonia's interest in deterring drug use by student athletes
47. Id. at 661. The Court's opinion suggested that a governmental interest need not necessarily
be compelling to justify a search under the reasonableness standard. See id. at 660-61 ("In both
Skinner and Von Raab, we characterized that government interest motivating the search as 'com-
pelling.' ... Whether that relatively high degree of government concern is necessary in this case
or not, we think it is met.").
48. Id. at 661.
49. Id. (citing Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (finding a compel-
ling governmental interest in keeping customs officials involved in drug interdiction drug-free),
and Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (finding a compelling
governmental interest in ensuring that railroad employees do not use drugs)).
50. Id. at 662.
51. Id.
52. But see id. at 665 ('The most significant element in this case is ... that the Policy was
undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as
guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care.").
53. Id. at 662 ("Apart from psychological effects, which include impairment of judgment, slow
reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain, the particular drugs screened by the Dis-
trict's Policy have been demonstrated to pose substantial risks to athletes.").
2002]
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to be significant, the Court next considered the "immediacy of the District's
concems. ' ' 4 Here, the Court relied heavily upon the findings of the district court
during the proceedings below. According to Justice Scalia:
[T]he District Court[] conclu[ded] that "a large segment of the student body,
particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebel-
lion," that "disciplinary actions had reached 'epidemic proportions,"' and
that "the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by
the students' misperceptions about the drug culture."
55
These findings were sufficient to convince the majority that the District had
acted to curtail an immediate crisis56 -one that was "of greater proportions"
than those that had prompted the Court to find a special need for suspicionless
drug testing in other circumstances. 57 All that remained for the Court's consid-
eration, then, was the effectiveness of the Vernonia policy.
iii. Efficacy of the response
The Court wasted few words before reaching its conclusion that the Dis-
trict's policy represented an effective response to the situation in District 47J.
"As to the efficacy of this means for addressing the problem," Justice Scalia's
majority opinion stated, "[it seems to us self-evident that a drug problem
largely fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular
danger to athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not
use drugs. 58 With those words, the Court had completed its analysis of the third
factor of its reasonableness test-the District had initiated an efficacious policy
to address a governmental interest that was both important and of immediate
concern.
4. Result
Although District 47J's drug testing policy authorized warrantless drug
tests in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the Supreme
54. Id.
55. Id. at 662-63 (quoting Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or.
1992)).
56. Id. at 662 ("We are not inclined to question-indeed, we could not possibly find clearly
erroneous--the District Court's conclusion ... ").
57. See id. at 663 (comparing the situation in Vernonia with those at issue in Skinner and Von
Raab).
58. Id.
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Court ultimately sustained its constitutionality.59 The Court based this result on
its judgment that the policy met the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness re-
quirement in light of the three-factor balancing test outlined above. In the words
of Justice Scalia: "Taking into account all of the factors we have considered
above--the decreased expectation of privacy, the relative unobtrusiveness of the
search, and the severity of the need met by the search-we conclude Vernonia's
Policy is reasonable and hence constitutional."6
°
The Court's opinion in Vemonia settled at least one thing-it left little
room for student athletes to challenge their school's drug testing programs when
those programs were motivated by evidence of a drug problem amongst partici-
pants in school-sponsored sports. Whether the Supreme Court's decision should
be read more broadly than that, however, remains an open question. 6 Along
these lines, the majority noted that it "caution[ed] against theassumption that
suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other con-
texts."62 In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg was even more explicit:
The Court constantly observes that the School District's drug-testing policy
applies only to students who voluntarily participate in interscholastic athlet-
ics .... I comprehend the Court's opinion as reserving the question whether
59. Id. at 665. After resolving the Fourth Amendment question, the Court still had to contend
with the Ninth Circuit's decision that District 471 had violated the rights of its student athletes
under the Oregon Constitution. See supra note 21. Justice Scalia explained the Court's decision on
that matter as follows:
The Ninth Circuit held that Vemonia's Policy not only violated the Fourth Amend-
ment, but also, by reason of that violation, contravened Article I, § 9, of the Oregon
Constitution. Our conclusion that the former holding was in error means that the latter
holding rested on a flawed premise. We therefore vacate [that] judgment ....
Id. at 666.
60. Id. at 664-65.
61. See, for example, the dissenting opinion of Judge Kenneth F. Ripple in Todd v. Rush
County Schools, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998), wherein Judge Ripple suggested:
Vernonia is susceptible to several different interpretations: (1) that "special needs" jus-
tifying drug testing always exist in the public school context, and thus school authori-
ties may require drug testing for any reason including controlling access to core
classes; (2) that it is necessary to show a particularized governmental need to impose
drug testing on a particular student population; (3) that drug testing is permitted in
special scholastic environments in which the need is well identified and the privacy
expectations are diminished.
Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d. 571, 572 (7th Cir. 1998) (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial
of petition for rehearing en banc).
62. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
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the District, on no more than the showing made here, constitutionally could
impose routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with others
in team sports, but on all students required to attend school.63
It would not be long before the federal courts would have to grapple with the
uncertainty that remained following the Court's ruling in Vernonia.
B. Suspicionless Drug Testing of Participants in Non-Athletic Extracurricular
Activities: Divergent Opinions
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia to uphold suspicionless
drug testing of public school students as a prerequisite for participation in ath-
letic activities, various school districts have implemented suspicionless drug
testing of students that participate in any extracurricular activity, rather than just
athletics. 64 These policies-while almost identical across different school dis-
tricts-have met inconsistent fates upon judicial review.
1. Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students Participating in Extracurricular Ac-
tivities Deemed Constitutional
Courts in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have found suspicionless drug
testing of students that engage in non-athletic extracurricular activities to be
constitutional. Their decisions-all handed down between 1998 and 2000-are
analyzed below in chronological order.
a. Todd v. Rush County Schools 65
The Seventh Circuit's first post-Vernonia look at a suspicionless testing
policy came in the 1998 case of Todd v. Rush County Schools. That case arose
after the parents of four students at Rushville Consolidated High School in
Rushville, Indiana challenged the constitutionality of the Rush County School
Board's testing program on behalf of their children. 66 Under the Rush County
program, high school students were "prohibit[ed] from participating in any ex-
tracurricular activities or driving to and from school unless [they] consented to a
test for drugs, alcohol or tobacco in random unannounced urinalysis examina-
63. Id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
64. See supra note 6.
65. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th
Cir. 1998).
66. Todd, 133 F.3d at 984.
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tions.' 67 The policy prevented the use of test results in any disciplinary proceed-
ings, but stated that students who tested positive could not participate in extra-
curricular activities or drive to and from school before passing a retest.6
Although the students objecting to the suspicionless testing policy in Todd
only wanted to videotape the football team or to continue as members of the
Library Club and the Future Farmers of America, 69 rather than participate in
interscholastic athletics, the court of appeals found that Vernonia controlled its
decision. 70 After stating the issue of the case, in fact, it took the court just over
one page in the Federal Reporter to reach its conclusion.7' The court recognized
that the policy challenged in Vernonia only applied to student athletes, but
stated that "students in other extracurricular activities, like athletes, 'can take
leadership roles in the school community and serve as an example to others."'
' 72
The court continued:
"[Plarticipation in interscholastic athletics is a benefit carrying with it en-
hanced prestige and status in the student community" and thus "it is not un-
reasonable to couple these benefits with an obligation to undergo drug test-
ing." Therefore, it is appropriate to include students who participate in extra-
curricular activities in the drug testing.
73
In the eyes of the three-judge panel, "Rush County Schools' drug testing pro-
gram [was] sufficiently similar to the program[] in Vernonia... to pass muster
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 74
The parents of the affected students filed a petition for an en banc rehear-
ing shortly after the panel issued its opinion.75 Over the objections of Judge
Ripple76 and three of his colleagues, the court denied that petition.n While the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 985.
70. See id. at 986. The court also relied upon its own ruling in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988), which upheld random urinalysis requirements for
athletes, including cheerleaders. Id.
71. See id. at 985-87.
72. Id. at 986 (quoting from the opinion of the district court below).
73. Id. (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1988)
(internal citation omitted)).
74. Id. at 986-87.
75. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998).
76. Judge Ripple authored one of the two dissenting opinions. He saw real distinctions between
the policies at issue in Vernonia and Todd:
This case involves an attempt by a school district to subject to suspicionless testing a
much broader group than the student athletes involved in the drug testing program in
Vernonia. The interests of the Rush County school district are substantially different
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Seventh Circuit was the first to uphold the application of a broad-ranging suspi-
cionless drug testing policy to students after Vernonia, the Eighth Circuit would
follow suit the next year.
b. Miller v. Wilkes
78
In 1999, the Eighth Circuit heard a Fourth Amendment challenge to the
Chemical Screen Test Policy promulgated by the school district in Cave City,
Arkansas.7 9 The policy at issue in Miller v. Wilkes permitted Cave City school
officials to conduct random drug and alcohol testing-by means of a urine
test--of all students in grades seven through twelve without individualized sus-
picion.80 Those students who tested positive faced a twenty-day probationary
period before being tested again. Any student who failed the second test was
"banned from participating in extracurricular school activities for a period of
one year. ' Moreover, students who wished to participate in extracurricular
activities but refused to consent to drug testing were also barred from those ac-
tivities. One student who fell into this latter category, Pathe Miller,8 2 sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the policy in a federal
district court.8 3 Chief Judge Susan Webber Wright granted summary judgment
in favor of the school district in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, prompting Miller to lodge an appeal-and the court of
appeals to undertake a de novo review of the case.
84
After pointing out that the Supreme Court had found the public school en-
vironment to provide the "requisite 'special needs' to allow a suspicionless
search to be considered reasonable and constitutional, the Miller court applied
from the ones at stake in Vernonia. There is, of course, the residual interest of the dis-
trict in protecting students from illicit drugs. But, unlike the situation in Vernonia,
there is no showing of a particularized need because of a "state of rebellion" in the
school, and certainly no showing that the targeted group, all students participating in
any extracurricular activity, presents a particularized need.
Id. at 572 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 571.
78. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot by No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13289 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999).
79. Miller, 172 F.3d at 576.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 577.
82. Id. ("Pathe Miller has averred that he wishes to participate, and would participate, in such
school activities as the Radio Club, prom committees, the quiz bowl, and school dances, among
others.").
83. Id.
84. Id.
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the Vernonia balancing test, 8 weighing "'the scope of the legitimate expectation
of privacy' and 'the character of the intrusion that is complained of' against 'the
nature and immediacy of the governmental concern ... and the efficacy of [the
search] for meeting it."' 6 The court's analysis of the second balancing factor-
which led the court to find the character of the intrusion to be insignificant87-
"closely track[ed] the Vernonia Court's treatment of [that same] factor." s This
made sense, given that the procedure for collecting urine samples under the
Cave City policy was virtually identical to the one employed in District 47J.89
The first and third factors would warrant slightly more attention, however.
At the outset of its discussion of the privacy interest enjoyed by Cave City
students, the court of appeals noted that its analysis of the first Vernonia factor
was "informed... by the Supreme Court's conclusion that children in the public
school setting have a lower expectation of privacy than do ordinary citizens. ' 90
The court brushed aside Miller's contention that the Vernonia Court had ruled as
it did specifically because the policy at issue there targeted athletes in particu-
lar.9' "As with athletics," Chief Judge Bowman wrote, "there are features of
extracurricular but non-athletic school activities that will lower the privacy ex-
85. The court of appeals explained its reliance on Vernonia as follows:
[A]s in Vernonia, neither a warrant issued upon a finding of probable cause nor indi-
vidualized suspicion of drug or alcohol use is required for the School District's
searches to be constitutional. But in the absence of such protections against an uncon-
stitutional search, and in cases like this where the search in question could not have
been anticipated by the Framers of the Constitution, the search must be shown to be
reasonable under a balancing test devised by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 578 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 580.
88. Id. at 579.
89. Compare id. (noting that, under the Cave City policy, the students were permitted to pro-
duce their urine samples in bathroom stalls), with Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (noting that the
Vernonia policy allowed males to produce samples at a urinal along a wall and females to produce
theirs in an enclosed stall).
90. Id. at 578 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).
91. See id. at 578-79. The court of appeals explained:
Pathe argues that the policy in Vernonia applied only to student athletes was more sig-
nificant to the Supreme Court in reaching its decision than was the fact that the policy
applied to students who were attending public school. We read the case differently. The
Court did say that "legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to ath-
letes." That is not to say, however, that it is only the student who seeks to engage in
extracurricular school sports activities whose legitimate expectation of privacy is so
diminished that a search such as this one can stand up to constitutional scrutiny.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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pectation of those who opt to participate to a point below that of fellow stu-
dents."92 Accordingly, the court found that students who choose to participate in
those activities "have a legitimate expectation of privacy that is diminished to a
level below that of the already lowered expectations of non-participating stu-
dents."
93
Having already found that students who wanted to join extracurricular ac-
tivities had a lessened expectation of privacy-and that the testing was of a rela-
tively noninvasive character-the court of appeals shifted its attention to the
third factor in the Vernonia balancing test. As to the nature of the school dis-
trict's concern, the court asserted: "The nature of the government concern is no
different here than it was in Vernonia." 94 Chief Judge Bowman reached this
conclusion with little trouble after defining the problem broadly as "substance
abuse in public schools." 95 As to the immediacy of the problem, however, the
court of appeals was constrained to admit that "there is not the same 'immedi-
acy' here as there was in Vernonia." 96 The lack of the sort of immediate crisis
that had plagued District 47J ultimately turned out to be of little consequence--
according to the court, "it [did] not mean that the need for deterrence is not im-
perative." 97 Finally, as to the effectiveness of the Cave City policy, the court
found no "reason to doubt the efficacy of the random testing policy as a measure
to discourage drug and alcohol abuse'and thus to prevent such abuse from be-
coming a problem in the Cave City schools.""
Based upon its consideration of the Venwnia factors, the court of appeals
92. Id. at 579. Judge Bowman continued:
Notwithstanding that they may not be as rigorous as those relating to student athletic
programs, extracurricular clubs and activities will have their own rules and regulations
for participating students that do not apply to students who do not wish to take part in
such activities. As with student athletes, someone will monitor the students for compli-
ance with the rules that the clubs and activities dictate.
Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 580.
95. Id.; cf. supra notes 49-53 (discussing the nature of the state interest in Vernonia as being
affected not just by its concern for the students and the education process in general, but also by
the fact that the Vemonia policy targeted athletes in particular because of their increased suscepti-
bility to deleterious effects of drug use).
96. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 580 (8th Cir. 1999) ("There is no 'immediate crisis' in
Cave City public schools," nor is there any "record evidence of any drug or alcohol problem in the
schools."), vacated as moot by No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289 (8th Cir. June 15,
1999).
97. Miller, 172 F.3d at 580 ("We do not believe.., that this difference must necessarily push
the Cave City policy into unconstitutional territory . .
98. ld.
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concluded that Cave City's interest in preventing drug use among students who
participated in extracurricular activities was sufficiently important to justify the
suspicionless drug testing policy at issue.99 This ruling was eventually vacated
as moot because Pathe Miller, the student challenging the drug testing policy of
his high school, graduated and was no longer subject to the school's authority.10'
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the court's initial opinion remains valuable as an
indicator of how-absent further guidance from the Supreme Court-the Eighth
Circuit might approach the issue of suspicionless drug testing of students in the
future.
c. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp.1l
After the Eighth Circuit vacated its substantive ruling in Miller, the Sev-
enth Circuit was once again the only federal circuit with valid case law support-
ing the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing as a condition of participa-
tion in non-athletic extracurricular activities. Even that precedent seemed shaky,
however, given that four Seventh Circuit judges had questioned the wisdom of
the Todd decision in 1998.102 As fate would have it, three of those same judges
were charged with the task of reviewing a very similar case in 2000.103
During the same year the Seventh Circuit handed down its ruling in Todd,
the Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation instituted a policy that permitted
"random, suspicionless drug testing of students involved in extracurricular ac-
tivities and of students driving to school.'1°4 Judge Ripple, who authored one of
the dissents to the court's denial of rehearing in Todd, delivered the opinion of
the three-judge panel in the case that examined the constitutionality of that pol-
icy two years later. 0 5 Unlike the Todd decision, the opinion in Joy v. Penn-
Harris-Madison School Corp. included an analysis of the school district's test-
ing policy under the Vernonia balancing factors.'06
The court of appeals looked first at the nature of the students' privacy in-
99. Id. at 581 ("Weighing the minimal intrusion on the lowered expectation of privacy against
the district's concern and the essentially unchallenged efficacy of its policy, we conclude that the
School District's interest is 'important enough to justify the particular search at hand."').
100. Miller v. Wilkes, No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999),
vacating as moot 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999).
101. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000).
102. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
103. The panel that heard Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp. consisted of Judges Flaum,
Ripple, and Rovner. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1053. Before considering the Vernonia balancing factors, the
panel reiterated its disagreement with the Todd decision: "We do not believe that the result in
Todd is compelled by the Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia." Id. at 1062-63.
104. Id. at 1054.
105. Id.
106. See generally id. at 1064-66.
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terest. Although "[p]ublic high school students have a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy than the general public," Judge Ripple wrote, "students do not shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door."" 7 This fact was important to the
court, because it permitted the panel to distinguish between the privacy interest
retained by student athletes and that enjoyed by participants in non-athletic ex-
tracurricular activities. According to the court, "unlike the athletes in Vernonia,
[Penn-Harris-Madison] students who participate in extracurricular activities or
who drive to school do not subject themselves to more explicit and routine loss
of bodily privacy as a necessary component of their participating in the activities
in question.' 1 8 This led the court to determine that "the expectation of privacy
for students in extracurricular activities or with parking permits, although less
than the general public, is still greater than the expectation of privacy for ath-
letes."' 9
Once it found that the Penn-Harris-Madison (PHM) challengers had greater
privacy expectations than the Vernonia student athletes, the court of appeals
moved on to consider the character of the intrusion created by the PHM policy.
Here the court could discern little difference between the PHM policy and that
of District 47J in Vernonia; accordingly, Judge Ripple quickly "conclude[d] that
the character of the intrusion [was] not overly invasive."" 0
Having discussed the first two factors of the Vernonia test, the court of ap-
peals next concentrated upon the three interrelated elements of the third factor-
the "[n]ature of the governmental concern,""' the "immediacy of the govern-
mental concern,"' 2 and the "efficacy of the means"'" 3 chosen to address that
concern. First, the court noted, "PHM [did] not explain[] how drug use affects
students in extracurricular activities differently than students in general."'" 4 Sec-
ond, the district failed to "establish[] that any immediate problem with drugs or
alcohol exist[ed] for its students in extracurricular activities."'1 5 Third-and
finally-the court did not believe the school had made any showing that the
107. Id. at 1063 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
108. id. ("Unlike the students in Vernonia, these students.., do not subject themselves, by
virtue of their participation in these activities, to regulations that further reduce their expectation
of privacy.").
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1063--64.
111. Id. at 1064.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1065.
114. Id. at 1064.
115. Id. at 1065 ("In the circumstances here, we think that PHM was required to show a correla-
tion between drug use and students in extracurricular activities, or other evidence of a particular-
ized need, before implementing its suspicionless drug testing policy for those particular student
groups.").
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program would actually work. According to Judge Ripple, "there [was] no
showing that the students subject to testing [were] the ones that [had to] be
tested to resolve the perceived problems."
'
"
6
Had the court been writing on a clean slate in Joy, it would have struck
down the school district's policy insofar as it applied to extracurricular partici-
pants." 7 The court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of that policy in light
of the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Todd,"8 but the judges made clear
that they "believe[d] that students involved in extracurricular activities should
not be subject to random, suspicionless drug testing as a condition of participa-
tion in the activity."" 9 As the next portion of this Note indicates, Judges Flaum,
Ripple, and Rovner are not the only jurists who feel this way.
2. Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students Participating in Extracurricular
Activities Deemed Unconstitutional
Prior to 2001, the Supreme Court of Colorado 20 and a federal district court
in Texas' 21 both invalidated suspicionless drug testing programs targeting high
school students who engaged in extracurricular activities. Two more federal
courts have weighed in with similar decisions in the past year.
a. Tannahill v. Lockney Independent School District 22
In mid-January of 2000, the parents of Brady Tannahill, a sixth-grade stu-
dent in the Lockney Independent School District, refused to sign the parental
consent form that would have permitted the District to perform a suspicionless
urinalysis test on their son.' 23 Pursuant to the District's policy-which applied
to all sixth- through twelfth-grade students at the tine-students such as Tan-
116. id.
117. Id. ("With respect to random testing of those who participate in extracurricular activities,
we believe that, according to the methodology employed by the Supreme Court in Vernonia, there
has been an inadequate showing that such an intrusion is justified.").
118. Id. at 1066. See also id. at 1067 ("On the basis of the doctrines of stare decisis and prece-
dent, we are constrained to affirm the judgment of the district court insofar as it permits the use of
random drug testing of students who desire to engage in extracurricular activities.").
119. Id. at 1066.
120. Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095 (1998) (en banc) (finding unconstitu-
tional "suspicionless urinalysis drug testing of all sixth through twelfth grade students participat-
ing in extracurricular activities").
121. Gardner v. Tulia lndep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:07-CV-020-J, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20253
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2000) (finding unconstitutional a district policy mandating "random suspi-
cionless drug testing of all students in grades 7-12 who engage in any extracurricular activity").
122. Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
123. Id. at 923.
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nahill were to be "suspen[ded] from participation in all extracurricular activities
for [twenty-one] days. ' 4 If their refusal continued, or if they consented and
then tested positive, students could be forced to attend alternative schooling and
"disqualiflied] from participating in any activity or receiving any honors for the
year." 12' After the Tannahills filed suit in United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, the District agreed to stay enforcement of its policy
until the courts had resolved the case.'2
Taking its cue from the Supreme Court's Vernonia decision, the district
court evaluated the Tannahills' Fourth Amendment claim under the three-factor
balancing test. 27 Judge Cummings first examined "the extent of the students'
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment."'8 Noting that "students who do
not participate in athletics are not subject to the same daily 'communal undress'
or public showering as student athletes," the court determined that the students
subject to testing in the Lockney Independent School District had higher expec-
tations of privacy than the athletes in Vernonia.'29 The court next considered the
second factor-"the intrusion upon students' privacy interests by the method of
testing. '' 3° Judge Cummings found the process for collecting urine samples in
the instant case to be sufficiently similar to that employed by District 47J in
Vernonia to conclude that "the method of testing impose[d] a low intrusion on
students' privacy interests.' ' 31 The district court then turned to the final factor,
which it identified as "whether the District has demonstrated a compelling state
interest to support its program of suspicionless drug testing.' 32 According to the
court, there was no evidence that "the District faced a drug problem of 'epi-
124. Id. at 922.
125. Id. at 923.
126. Id.
127. See generally id. at 928-30. The court also noted that a 1989 decision by the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
"appear[ed] to be controlling on the question at bar." Id. at 924. In Brooks v. East Chambers Con-
solidated Independent School District, the district court struck down "a school district's manda-
tory, suspicionless drug testing program for all students in grades 7-12 who participated in extra-
curricular activities" in part because there had been little evidence in that district of a student drug
problem. Id. (citing Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.
Tex. 1989), aff'd, 930 F.2d 915 (5thCir. 1991)). The Lockney Independent School District argued
that Brooks had been overruled by subsequent decisions, but the district court declined "to make
such a determination," opting instead to evaluate the District's policy according to the standards
laid down in Vernonia and related cases. Id. at 925.
128. Id. at 928.
129. Id. at 929 ("The students subject to drug testing in the Lockney School District comprise a
much broader segment of the student population than the group of student athletes in Vernonia.
Their expectations of privacy are higher.").
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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demic proportions' as encountered in the 'drug infested' Vernonia schools.' 3 3
The Lockney policy, Judge Cummings wrote, "at best ... attempt[ed] to gener-
ally reduce drug use by students [because it was] not specifically targeted to the
special needs of a drug crisis or safety-sensitive job functions."' 34
After discussing each of the Vernonia factors, the district court performed
the required balancing. Judge Cummings explained his thinking as follows:
Balancing the factors considered above, including students' increased expec-
tation of privacy over that of student athletes, the unobtrusiveness of the
method of testing, and the near dearth of evidence demonstrating a need to be
met by the search, this Court finds that the District's drug testing program is
unreasonable and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.'
35
His conclusion that "the District ha[d] failed to demonstrate a sufficient special
need to justify suspicionless drug testing,'' 36 came just days before the Tenth
Circuit issued a similar ruling in Earls v. Board of Education.137
b. Earls v. Board of Education
1 38
As was the case in the Lockney Independent School District, there was lit-
tle evidence of widespread drug usage by students in Oklahoma's Tecumseh
Public School District. 39 Nevertheless, the District adopted a Student Activities
Drug Testing Policy in 1998.' 40 That policy "require[d] drug testing of all stu-
dents who participate[d] 'in any extra-curricular activity such as [Future Farm-
ers of America], [Future Homemakers of America], Academic Team, Band,
Vocal, Porn Pon, Cheerleader and Athletics.""441 The policy further provided
133. Id at 929-30 ("Furthermore, a study conducted in 1998 before implementation of the pol-
icy indicated that drug use was generally lower in the District than in other Texas schools.").
134. Id at 930.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 931.
137. The Tannahill decision was issued on March 1, 2001, id. at 919; the Tenth Circuit handed
down its ruling on March 21, 2001, Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1264 (10th Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001).
138. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10thCir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001).
139. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1272 ("Mhe evidence of drug use among those subject to the [Tecum-
seh] Policy is far from the 'epidemic' and 'innediate crisis' faced by the Vemonia schools and
emphasized in the Supreme Court's [Vernonia] opinion.... Rather, the evidence of actual drug
usage, particularly among the tested students, is minimal ... .
140. Id. at 1266.
141. Id. (quoting the Tecumseh policy). Under the policy, "[elach student seeking to participate
in such activities must sign a written consent [form] agreeing to submit to drug testing prior to
participating in the activity, randomly during the year while participating, and at any time while
participating upon reasonable suspicion." Id. Since the drug testing policy before the court of
20021
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that students who did not consent to random testing--or those who failed drug
tests-would be barred from further participation in extracurricular activities. 42
Test results were to be placed in confidential files, were not to be disclosed to
law enforcement authorities, and, under the policy, could not form the basis for
any academic sanctions. 43
The parents of two Tecumseh High School students who wanted to partici-
pate in non-athletic extracurricular activities objected to the District's suspi-
cionless testing program insofar as it applied to non-athletes. Accordingly, they
filed a federal civil rights action against the Board of Education of the Tecum-
seh Public School District and the District itself, alleging that the policy violated
the students' constitutional rights.'" After the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma granted the school district's motion of sum-
mary judgment, the plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit.' 4
At the outset of its decision, the court of appeals announced that it would
use the Supreme Court's Vernonia ruling as its primary guide.14 Writing for the
majority, Judge Anderson stated: "[W]e agree that the District has demonstrated
that there is a special need for a relaxation of the Fourth Amendment's standards
in this case, and conclude that the constitutionality of the Policy [must] be de-
termined by balancing the factors set forth in Vernonia."'47 With that, the court
proceeded to consider each factor in turn.
Examining the nature of the privacy interest at stake for the students, the
court observed that there were "aspects of participating in extracurricular activi-
ties which do legitimately lower a student's expectation of privacy."' 4 Like
athletes, Judge Anderson wrote, students who engage in extracurricular activi-
ties "agree to follow the directives and adhere to the rules set out by the coach or
other director of the activit[ies]" in which they participate 49 Accordingly, the
majority concluded that, "like athletes, participants in other extracurricular ac-
tivities have a somewhat lesser expectation of privacy than other students."' 5
appeals in Earls only applied to students who participated in extracurricular activities, it was
narrower in scope than the one at issue in Tannahill, see supra text accompanying note 124, but
broader than the athlete testing program detailed in Vernonia.
142. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 1266.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1270 (noting that Vernonia is the only Supreme Court case dealing with suspicionless
drug testing of public school students).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1276.
149. Id. (explaining that "'[tihis inevitably requires that their personal freedom to conduct them-
selves is, in some small way, constrained at least some of the time").
150. Id.
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As previous courts had done,' 5 ' the Earls court wasted little time consider-
ing the second Vernonia factor-the character of the intrusion complained of.
The court of appeals determined that Tecumseh's urinalysis testing procedures
were "virtually identical" to those used in Vernonia and, as such, "reach[ed] the
same conclusion as did the Supreme Court.' 52 In the eyes of the majority, "'the
invasion of privacy was not significant."" 3
The court's view of the Tecumseh policy-at least in light of the first two
balancing factors---did not differ substantially, from that expressed by the
Vernonia Court. The third Vernonia factor "tipped the balancing analysis decid-
edly in favor of the plaintiffs," however.'54 In the majority's estimation, the
"'nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue. . . and the effi-
cacy of [the chosen] means for meeting it"" 55 were simply not as compelling in
the instant case as they had been in Vernonia. First, Judge Anderson noted that
"the Court in Vernonia [had] emphasized the particular dangers to athletes
caused by drug usage."' 6 According to the court of appeals, however, this con-
cern was not applicable to all extracurricular participants:
While there may indeed be some extracurricular activities that involve a
safety issue comparable to that of athletes, there are other students involved
in extracurricular activities and therefore subject to the Policy who can
hardly be considered a safety risk .... Thus, safety cannot be the sole justifi-
cation for testing all students in competitive extracurricular activities. .... 157
Second, the majority suggested that Tecumseh's reliance on "the fact that
all extracurricular students are subject to less supervision than students in class-
rooms when they are staying after school to meet and/or practice" was also mis-
placed. 58 According to Judge Anderson, like extracurricular participants,
"[s]tudents who do not participate in any extracurricular activities are, at times,
less supervised than they are in the classroom. '1 59 That being said, the court
151. See, e.g., supra note 110 and accompanying text.
152. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1276 (10thCir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509
(2001).
153. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660
(1995)).
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1277 (noting that "[ilt is difficult to imagine how participants in vocal choir, or the
academic team, or even the [Future Homemakers of America] are in physical danger if they com-
pete in those activities while using drugs, any more than any student is at risk from simply using
drugs").
158. Id.
159. Id. The court substantiated its assertion that non-extracurricular participants were some-
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asserted that "neither a concern for safety nor a concern about the degree of su-
pervision provides a sufficient reason for testing the particular students whom
the District chose to test under the Policy."'
6
It was not just the District's argument about the nature of the governmental
concern at issue that troubled the court of appeals. "[G]iven the paucity of evi-
dence of an actual drug abuse problem among those subject to the Policy," the
majority continued, "the immediacy of the District's concern is greatly dimin-
ished."' 6' The absence of a genuine drug problem at Tecumseh High School
troubled the court for another reason as well. According to Judge Anderson,
"without a demonstrated drug abuse problem among the group being tested, the
efficacy of the District's solution to its perceived problem is similarly greatly
diminished."1 62
Upon weighing these portions of the final factor along with the first two
balancing factors, the court of appeals concluded that the Tecumseh policy-
insofar as it required participants in non-athletic extracurricular activities to
submit to random, suspicionless urinalysis exams-did not meet the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard.1 63 Furthermore--much like Judge Rip-
ple had suggested in his Todd dissent' 6-the Tenth Circuit voiced concern over
the potential slippery slope that might follow judicial validation of broad-based,
times less supervised than they would normally be in the classroom setting as follows:
[Tihey are [less supervised] in the hallways between classes, at lunch, [and] immedi-
ately before and after school while they are entering and leaving school premises ...
Moreover, . .. there are other student organizations and groups which take field trips,
meet after school, and otherwise engage in precisely the same kinds of less supervised
activities as those in extracurricular activities subject to drug testing under the Policy.
Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Judge Anderson distinguished the efficacy of District 47J's policy from that of the Te-
cumseh Public School District's as follows:
While the Court in Vernonia had no trouble identifying the efficacy of a drug testing
policy for athletes when the athletes were at the heart of the drug problem, we see little
efficacy [here] in a drug testing policy which tests students among whom there is no
measurable drug problem.
Id.
163. Id. at 1278.
164. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571, 572 (7th Cir. 1998) ("mhe panel's formula
permits... widespread testing on the ground that 'successful extracurricular activities require
healthy students.' This rationale admits of no principled limitation."). See also Joy v. Penn-Harris-
Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000) ("The danger of the slippery slope continues
to haunt our jurisprudence.").
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random testing schemes in the absence of identifiable exigencies.1 65 To guard
against the accompanying denial of students' constitutional rights, the court
suggested the imposition of the following requirement:
[A]ny district seeking to impose a random suspicionless drug testing policy
as a condition to participation in a school activity must demonstrate that there
is some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those
subject to the testing, such that testing that group of students will actually re-
dress its drug problem. "Special needs must rest on demonstrated reali-
ties.""
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ebel took issue with this line of reasoning.
He suggested that, "[n]otwithstanding the majority's statement that no special
need from random, suspicionless drug testing must be demonstrated by the
school district in [these cases], the majority appear[ed] to reimpose a special
needs requirement toward the end of its opinion."'167 Such a requirement, Judge
Ebel argued, "mandates a more detailed demonstration than was ever [called
for] in ... Vemonia."' 68 According to Judge Ebel's view, Supreme Court prece-
dent establishes that special needs are inherently present in the public school
context; in light of this fact, courts should not impose the traditional special
needs test in suspicionless drug testing cases.' 69 Instead, the dissent suggested,
judges should immediately "proceed to the required Vernonia balancing analy-
165. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Unless a district is re-
quired to demonstrate [some identifiable drug abuse] problem, there is no limit on what students a
school may randomly and without suspicion test. Without any limitation, schools could test all of
their students simply as a condition of attending school."), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001).
166. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1278 (quoting United Teachers of New Orleans v. Orleans Parish Sch.
Bd., 142 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 1998)).
167. Id. at 1281 (Ebel, J., dissenting). According to Judge Ebel:
[Bly reimposing a special needs requirement at the end of its opinion, and thereby re-
quiring a school district to demonstrate an "identifiable drug abuse problem among a
sufficient number of those subject to the testing," the majority has both reneged on its
earlier holding that a school district need not demonstrate a special need for random,
suspicionless drug testing in the public school context and required more of the school
district in this case than was ever required in ... Vernonia.
Id. at 1283.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1279 ("[A] public school district need not demonstrate a particularized 'special need'
to randomly test students engaged in extracurricular activities for illegal drug use. The 'special
needs' test, which is used in non-school settings to justify suspicionless searches, is dispensed
with (or deemed satisfied) in a school setting .. ").
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sis.' ' 70 We may soon know which of these approaches the Supreme Court pre-
fers; in the meantime, however, there is another Supreme Court opinion regard-
ing special needs and suspicionless drug testing to consider.
C. Chandler v. Miller: Refining the Scope of Constitutional Suspicionless Drug
Testing
In 1997, just two years after its ruling in Vernonia, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the scope of constitutionally permissible suspicionless drug testing from
another angle. In Chandler v. Miller,171 the Court struck down a Georgia law
that required candidates for designated state offices to certify that they had taken
a urinalysis drug test within thirty days of qualifying for nomination or elec-
tion-and that the test result was negative. 72 Since the suspicionless Georgia
testing program constituted a search for purposes of its constitutional analysis,
the Court considered whether the testing fell within the "special needs" excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment requirement that searches be based on "individu-
alized suspicion of wrongdoing" 73M-the same exception that, under Vernonia,
permits suspicionless drug testing of student athletes.1
74
During the course of its opinion, the Chandler Court elaborated on the
conditions required for a search to fall within the special needs exception. Ac-
cording to Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the majority, "[o]ur precedents estab-
lish that the proffered special need for drug testing must be substantial-
important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest,
sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of
individualized suspicion.' '175 Applying this understanding of the special needs
exception to the facts at hand in Chandler, the Court found that, while Georgia's
170. Id. at 1280. Judge Ebel disagreed with the majority about the ultimate result of the balanc-
ing process as well:
I find this to be a difficult case, and acknowledge that the balancing of the Vernonia
factors is far from easy. Given the weight that I believe is properly afforded each factor
set forth in Vernonia, however, I would find that the Policy survives the constitutional
balancing test and should therefore be upheld.
Id. at 1285; see generally id. at 1283-85 (detailing Judge Ebel's view of the proper balancing of
interests).
171. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
172. Id. at 308.
173. Id. at 313. As the Court's ultimate conclusion would demonstrate, absent special needs,
suspicionless drug testing policies cannot satisfy the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness re-
quirement.
174. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
175. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
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drug testing program was "relatively noninvasive,"176 the State had produced no
evidence of a drug use problem among its politicians or candidates for state po-
litical office.177 Additionally, as potential candidates could abstain from using
illegal drugs before the thirty-day testing window, the Georgia law served as an
ineffective method for detecting drug use among the tested population. 178
According to the Supreme Court, "where the risk to public safety is sub-
stantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches less calibrated to the risk may
rank as 'reasonable' .... But where, as in this case, public safety is not genu-
inely in jeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no
matter how conveniently arranged.' ' 179 In light of the dearth of evidence pro-
duced to show that the tested population had a drug abuse problem-and the
testing's lack of effectiveness at identifying drug users-the Court concluded
that Georgia had not demonstrated that its testing program fell within the special
needs exception to the normal requirement that reasonable searches be con-
ducted on the basis of individualized suspicion.t18
It has now been five years since the Supreme Court's ruling in Chandler-
and seven since Vemonia came down. The circuit courts, unsure of the precise
implications of those two high court rulings, are once again looking to the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court for guidance on the issue of suspicionless drug test-
ing regimes.181
176. Id.
177. Id. at 319. The Chandler Court underscored the need for demonstrating that the tested
population has a drug abuse problem, noting that such a demonstration had been made in prior
cases upholding suspicionless drug testing. On this point, the Court stated:
A demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not in all cases necessary to the validity
of a testing regime, would shore up an assertion of special need for a suspicionless
general search program. Proof of unlawful drug use may help to clarify-and to sub-
stantiate-the precise hazards posed by such use. Thus, the evidence of drug and alco-
hol use by railway employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks in Skinner and the im-
mediate crisis prompted by a sharp rise in students' use of unlawful drugs in Vernonia
bolstered the government's and school officials' arguments that drug-testing programs
were warranted and appropriate.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
178. Id. at 319-20.
179. Id. at 323.
180. Id. As Georgia's suspicionless testing program did not fall within the special needs
exception, the Court ruled that the testing program violated the Fourth Amendment. See id.
181. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1287 (10th Cir. 2001) (Ebel, J., dissenting)
("[P]erhaps the Supreme Court will grant a writ of certiorari to resolve the split among the circuits
that we have today created on the important constitutional issue presented in this case."), cert.
granted, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001); Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1067 (7th
Cir. 2000) ('The scope of Vernonia remains undecided today. Until we receive further guidance
from the Supreme Court, we will stand by our [opinion] that the special needs exception must be
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III. CURTAILING SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING FOR STUDENTS
PARTICIPATING IN EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIvrrIEs
A. Constitutional Arguments
Based upon the Court's reasoning in Vernonia,18 2 the application of that
decision by various federal courts to the testing of students as a condition of
participation in non-athletic extracurricular activities,183 and the Court's analysis
in Chandler," it seems likely that the Supreme Court will rule in Earls that
suspicionless drug testing of students who desire to participate in non-athletic
extracurricular activities is unconstitutional. In particular, one would expect the
Court to pay close attention to its Vernonia and Chandler rulings as it evaluates
the constitutionality of conducting suspicionless drug testing on students who
seek to participate in the school band, an academic club, or the Future Farmers
of America.
1. The Implications of Vernonia
Under the reasonableness test provided by the Court in Vernonia, suspi-
cionless drug testing of students participating in non-athletic extracurricular
activities should not be deemed constitutional. Although the intrusion commit-
ted against the tested student's privacy interest is the same for both athletic and
non-athletic extracurricular participants, 85 the first and third Vernonia factors
suggest that the policy at issue in Earls cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.
Analysis of those factors-the privacy interest implicated by conducting drug
tests and the effectiveness of suspicionless drug tests in addressing the nature
and immediacy of the governmental concern-should reveal that testing stu-
dents participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities presents a factually,
and therefore constitutionally, distinct scenario from that surrounding the testing
of student athletes.
With respect to the first factor, there are notable differences between the
privacy interests of students engaging in athletics and those participating in
other activities. The Vernonia Court has already told us as much: While students
justified according to the methodology set forth in Vernonia.").
182. See generally supra Part II.A.
183. See generally supra Part ll.B.
184. See generally supra Part ll.C.
185. The intrusion committed against the student tested for athletic and non-athletic extracur-
ricular participation is the same because the testing of both segments of the student population is
conducted via urinalysis testing.
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have a lesser expectation of privacy than the population at large, the legitimate
privacy interests of athletes are even more diminished than those of the ordinary
student.' Consequently, participation in a school band, chess club, or other
non-athletic extracurricular activity does not reduce a student's expectation of
privacy to the same degree that participation in an athletic activity would.'
7
Extracurricular clubs and activities do not require communal undress and show-
ering, a preseason physical exam, or the procurement of health insurance-
factors that the Vernonia Court cited as evidence of an athlete's diminished ex-
pectation of privacy.'18
Non-athletic extracurricular involvement does share some of the character-
istics of athletic participation that the Court identified in Vernonia, of course.
For instance, such involvement is voluntary and requires adherence to rules and
regulations as a condition of participation.'8 9 Nevertheless, these factors do not
reduce the expectation of privacy enjoyed by non-athletic participants to the
same low level as that which is retained by student athletes; without more, they
appear insufficient to make "reasonable" the governmental imposition of a sus-
picionless search upon an individual.'190
Differences are even more apparent with regard to the third Vernonia fac-
tor-which necessitates consideration of the efficacy of drug testing as a means
of addressing the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern. In weigh-
ing this element, the Vernonia Court reasoned that deterring drug use was an
important governmental interest not only for all students, but also for athletes in
particular. 19' According to Justice Scalia's opinion, the risk of bodily harm
among athletes as a result of drug use is "particularly high."' 192 For instance,
drugs such as amphetamines have especially dangerous effects on users who
engage in any type of exercise.' 93 Participation in non-athletic extracurricular
186. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995); supra Part II.A.3.a.
187. See, e.g., Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1063 (7th Cir. 2000);
supra note 109 and accompanying text.
188. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657; supra note 35 and accompanying text.
189. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1276 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509
(2001).
190. Consider a hypothetical requirement that licensed drivers consent to random, suspicionless
drug tests as a condition for keeping their licenses: Although drivers who obtain government-
issued licenses voluntarily submit to a pre-established system of rules and regulations, it hardly
seems reasonable to allow the government power to conduct random drug tests upon them. But cf.
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of
stopping motorists at "sobriety checkpoints" along public highways for the purpose of removing
drunk drivers from the road).
191. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662; supra note 53 and accompanying text.
192. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995).
193. Id. ("Amphetamines produce an 'artificially induced heart rate increase, peripheral vaso-
constriction, blood pressure increase, and masking of the normal fatigue response,' making them a
'very dangerous drug when used during exercise of any type."') (quoting Hawkins, Drugs and
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activities, however, does not-by itself--create a risk of injury to the drug user,
or his or her fellow activity participants, beyond that normally associated with
drug use.194
Besides arguing that there was a heightened risk of physical injury to ath-
letes, the Court in Vernonia also noted that the athletes of the Vernonia School
District were the leaders of the District's drug problems-not only significantly
engaging in drug use themselves, but, through the "role model effect,"
encouraging other students to do so as well. 195 An "immediate crisis" had
erupted in the District 47J, the Court explained, because "a large segment of the
student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a
state of rebellion."'196 Hence, the Vernonia School District tailored its drug-
testing policy so as to impact only those students who were most influential in
causing the District's "immediate crisis"--athletes who were leading the drug-
use movement and whose own drug use presented a significant physical harm to
themselves and to other students. 197
In contrast, drug use by members of the math club or the glee club does not
carry with it any danger to the user or to others greater than that involved with
drug use by a student not participating in extracurricular activities. As physical
exertion is not a defining characteristic of most non-athletic extracurricular ac-
tivities, participants in these activities are no more likely to injure themselves or
others than student drug users that do not engage in extracurricular activities.
Additionally, a policy imposing suspicionless drug tests on all participants of
Other Ingesta: Effects on Athletic Performance, in H. APPENzEi.ER, MANAGING SPORTS AND RISK
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 90, 90-91(1993)).
194. See Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the Penn-Harris-Madison schools had not "explained how drug use affects students in extra-
curricular activities differently than students in general"); supra note 114 and accompanying text.
195. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663; supra note 58 and accompanying text.
196. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-63 (internal quotation marks omitted); supra note 55 and ac-
companying text.
197. Supreme Court rulings on the constitutionality of suspicionless drug tests before Vernonia
likewise stressed that risk of physical harm to the drug-using party, or to others by the drug-using
party, was crucial in establishing that the government had a sufficient interest in compelling indi-
viduals to undergo suspicionless drug tests. For instance, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, a case in which the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing for railroad employees, the
Court stated:
Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to oth-
ers that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences. Much
like persons who have routine access to dangerous nuclear power facilities, employees
who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great human loss before
any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors or others.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (internal citation omitted).
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extracurricular activities would not target the segment of the student body re-
sponsible for a school district's drug problem. Drug use appeared to be a defin-
ing trait of the athletes of the Vernonia School District, 98 but it is improbable
that members across a diverse spectrum of non-athletic extracurricular activities
would share this common trait-especially not to the exclusion of students that
chose not to participate in extracurricular activities at all.
2. The Implications of Chandler
On its face, Chandler concerns suspicionless drug testing of political can-
didates, rather than students. Nevertheless, its factual premise in some ways
bears greater resemblance to the testing of students participating in non-athletic
extracurricular activities than does the factual premise of Vernonia. Signifi-
cantly, the policy at issue in Chandler targeted a group that the state could not
demonstrate to have a substance abuse problem. 99 This led the Supreme Court
to determine that the state's proffered need was only "symbolic."" Because the
need was not "'special,' as that term draws meaning from [the Court's] case-
law," the Chandler Court concluded, the suspicionless testing policy could not
meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 201
As was the case in Chandler, it seems highly unlikely that most school dis-
tricts could demonstrate that a diverse group of students, participating in a vari-
ety of non-athletic extracurricular activities, has a drug abuse problem such that
a special need for conducting suspicionless drug tests on these students exists.202
Indeed, none of the federal cases detailed in this Note confronting the issue of
suspicionless drug testing include findings that students who engage in non-
athletic extracurricular activities are more likely than other students to use ille-
gal drugs. For this reason, the Court in Earls will likely rule that suspicionless
testing of the targeted group is an ineffective means of deterring drug use-
much like it did in Chandler with respect to political candidates.
B. Policy Considerations
In addition to the constitutional considerations presented in this Note as to
why suspicionless drug testing of extracurricular participants should not be up-
198. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662-63 (1995); supra note 55 and
accompanying text.
199. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997); supra note 177 and accompanying text.
200. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
201. Id.
202. But see supra note 169 and accompanying text (laying out Judge Ebel's view to the con-
trary).
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held, there are also policy arguments that support striking down such testing.
Foremost among these considerations is the inadequacy of the response by the
school board to a student who tests positive for drug use as a result of suspi-
cionless drug testing.
1. Inadequate Response to Known Instances of Drug Usage
Pursuant to many suspicionless drug testing policies-including the one
currently before the Supreme Court-the penalty for a student whose test yields
a positive result is simply suspension from all extracurricular activities.203 Posi-
tive test results are not turned over to law enforcement authorities, and no fur-
ther disciplinary or academic sanctions are imposed upon students who test
positive.204 These penalty systems threaten to reduce the potential effectiveness
that suspicionless drug testing might otherwise have on student drug usage by
(a) removing troubled students from school guidance and (b) freeing up more
time for students to use drugs.
a. Removalfrom school guidance
The authors of suspicionless drug testing policies probably hope that the
prospect of random testing will convince students to give up their drug habits in
order to ensure their eligibility for extracurricular activities. School districts
ought to take into account, however, the likelihood that some students-perhaps
because they are addicted, or perhaps because they value drugs above extracur-
riculars--either cannot or will not stop using drugs. In circumstances where the
penalty for a positive drug test is discontinued extracurricular participation, a
student who is already using illegal drugs may be inclined to withdraw from
participating in extracurricular activities in order to avoid submitting to a drug
test, or-in the event that the student tests positive-be forced to terminate his
or her extracurricular involvement. Under either scenario, the student would
become further removed from the positive support and guidance that his or her
school has to offer. As a result, school personnel may have more difficulty se-
curing treatment options for the drug-abusing student.205
It would make more sense if, in addition to penalizing students for their
substance abuse, these policies also facilitated school-initiated counseling or
other methods to keep those with problems under district control. Assuming the
courts are correct in their assessment of the unique tutelary and supervisory
203. See, e.g., Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S.
Ct. 509 (2001); supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Earls, 242 F.3d at 1268; supra note 143.
205. See Bishop, supra note 6, at 240.
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powers of public schools, W6 perhaps school districts ought to use them to ensure
that students with drug problems get the help they need.
b. Freeing up time for more drug use
Another potential side effect to many suspicionless drug testing regimes
flows from their narrow focus and shortsighted penalty provisions. If school
policy does nothing more than force drug users to quit their extracurricular ac-
tivities, its most important effect might be to free up more time for students to
use drugs after school--during hours which they might otherwise be engaged in
productive extracurricular activities. This could serve to exacerbate current drug
problems, as well as to make those problems more difficult to overcome. After
all, barring a student from participating in an activity that could reveal an undis-
covered talent or passion, or which might provide a glimpse of opportunities
available to the student besides drug use, hardly seems like good public policy.
2. The Slippery Slope Toward Testing All Students
Just because the new, post-Vernonia breed of suspicionless drug testing
programs might not go far enough toward correcting drug problems where they
now exist does not mean that these policies are not overbroad in terms of which
students they target. Early suspicionless testing programs focused solely upon
student athletes. 2 7 After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such
testing in Vernonia, however, school districts began implementing policies to
test athletes and non-athletes who participated in school-related extracurricular
activities.208 If the Court permits these policies to continue, it will only be a mat-
ter of time before more schools seek to expand suspicionless drug testing fur-
ther-perhaps to cover the entire student body.2 9 In fact, districts in Arkansas
206. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) ("Mhe nature of [the
State's) power over schoolchildren is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision
and control that could not be exercised over free adults.").
207. See, e.g., Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988) (uphold-
ing random urinalysis testing of student athletes); Venonia Sch. Dist. 47 J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) (upholding a similar policy).
208. See, e.g., Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (striking down random
testing policy applicable to all participants in extracurricular activities), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct.
509 (2001).
209. Consider, for example, this exchange between the Seventh Circuit panel that decided Joy
and the attorney for the school district: -
THE COURT: So the slippery slope argument ought to be very much in our minds. I
mean, you'll be back here in another year with another school district who wants to test
everybody. And you will say there is no principled distinction between the holding you
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and Texas have already done so.210 The testing policies of these districts raise
the danger that student drug testing may be on a slippery slope leading to the
testing of ever greater segments of the student population and the corresponding
diminishment of the privacy rights of students.21 The courts will likely have to
step in at some point; perhaps now is the time.
3. A Symbolic Response
Finally, policies like the one at issue in Earls do not appear to put the fo-
cus where it should be-upon students that schools have reasonable grounds to
believe are using drugs. As mentioned above, these policies bear greater resem-
blance to the Georgia law struck down by the Chandler Court than to the drug
testing program that the Court let stand in Vernonia.212 To target a clearly de-
fined group with a history of drug problems is one thing; to require random test-
ing of groups not known to possess any abnormal inclination toward drug usage
is another. 21 3 Consider the Supreme Court's assessment of the since-invalidated
Georgia statute:
What is left, after close review of Georgia's scheme, is the image that the
State seeks to protect. By requiring candidates for public office to submit to
drug testing, Georgia displays its commitment to the struggle against drug
abuse .... But Georgia asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the
State's elected officials.... The need revealed, in short, is symbolic ....
That language seems equally applicable to the efforts of some school districts
with respect to suspicionless drug testing of extracurricular participants. The
get today and the next case. It's just a matter of time till it gets here. Right?
COUNSEL: Absolutely, your honor.
Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 1052, 1066 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting from the
oral argument).
210. See Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding a policy that allowed school
officials to test randomly all seventh- through twelfth-grade students in Cave City, Arkansas),
vacated as moot by No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999); Tan-
nahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (invalidating policy
that allowed random testing of all sixth- through twelfth-graders).
211. See Bishop, supra note 6, at 218.
212. Supra Part Ill.A.2.
213. Compare Vemronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding the school
district's program targeting a group with a demonstrated history of drug abuse), with Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (striking down the State's policy targeting a group that did not have
such a history).
214. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321-22 (emphasis added).
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prospect of schools enacting measures that do little more than make them look
concerned with one societal problem or another ought to concern us-at least
where those policies threaten to impinge upon the civil liberties of schoolchil-
dren.
In Chandler, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the rest of the Court
had ventured into the realm of making policy judgments when it struck down
the Georgia drug testing law.215 Perhaps his argument that "[n]othing in the
Fourth Amendment or in any other part of the Constitution prevents a State from
enacting a statute whose principal vice is that it may seem misguided or even
silly to the members of [the Supreme] Court' 216 was correct. If nothing else,
however, legislators ought to think about requiring school boards to demonstrate
a real need before they draft symbolic policies that have little, if any, practical
effect on drug use among students.
C. Action by State Legislatures
Despite the unanswered constitutional questions surrounding suspicionless
drug testing of extracurricular participants, school boards in several states have
seen fit to implement programs that permit such testing.217 If the Supreme Court
fails to rule that these regimes are unconstitutional, state legislators should con-
sider ways in which they could change the system for the better.
1. Legislative curtailment of suspicionless drug testing
Perhaps the Court will follow the Chief Justice's guidance from Chandler
and decide that-as he suggested there-it is not for the courts to question the
types of policy decisions that are best handled by our nation's legislatures.2 8
Even if this happens, it should not deter elected representatives from tackling
the issue themselves. In light of the concerns presented in this Note regarding
the negative ramifications of these policies, state legislatures should act to cur-
tail the implementation of suspicionless drug testing if the Supreme Court does
not. No matter how the Court rules, it should not prevent legislators from con-
cluding that testing programs similar to the one at issue in Earls are bad public
policy. State legislatures could-and perhaps should-take action to prevent the
continued enforcement of these programs against non-athletic extracurricular
participants.
215. Id. at 328 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
216. Id.
217. See supra note 6.
218. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 328 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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2. Make suspicionless drug testing policies more effective
Given the constitutional and policy concerns surrounding these tests, one
would hope that most people would not label the politician who decided to ban
them "soft on drugs"-but it is ultimately up to legislators to decide how they
will approach the issue. Perhaps some will conclude that it is not politically fea-
sible to prohibit public schools from conducting suspicionless drug tests. If they
are not comfortable with the prospect of banning suspicionless testing, however,
legislators should at least take steps to ensure that school districts' testing poli-
cies become more effective at reducing student drug use.
a. Enact uniform policies that include parental notification requirements
Rather than leaving it to local school boards to implement drug testing
policies, state legislatures could act to ensure passage of uniformly-enacted test-
ing policies that have the beneficial effect of reducing student drug use. In fur-
therance of that end, state law could require that if a student tests positive
through the school's suspicionless drug testing program, an appropriate school
official-a school counselor, the school principal, or perhaps the student's
homeroom teacher-will confer with the parents of the tested student and pro-
vide them with the student's test result. Thus, parents would be made aware of
their children's drug use so they can more effectively monitor students at
home-as well as assist them in receiving rehabilitative treatment.
b. Provide an appropriate response to positive test results
Additionally, the penalty of removing a student who tests positive from all
extracurricular participation is not sufficient to combat student drug use.219
Rather than preventing a student from participating in extracurricular activities,
these policies should allow the student who tests positive the option of continu-
ing his or her extracurricular participation, provided that he or she receives
counseling through the school or through a treatment program selected by his or
her parent. In addition to counseling, follow-up drug tests should be adminis-
tered at regular intervals in order to monitor whether the student's drug use has
219. As the testing in the Earls case currently before the Supreme Court demonstrates, the pen-
alty for a student who tests positive is simply discontinued participation in extracurricular activi-
ties. The student is driven further away from the potentially protective and rehabilitative environ-
ment offered by the advisors, counselors, teachers and support staff of his or her school. Further-
more, the student, who is no longer able to participate in the band or the glee club, will have even
more time to spend in pursuit of his or her drug abuse problem. Suspicionless drug testing that
does not encourage rehabilitative behavior has the potential to compound-rather than improve-
the drug problem faced by our nation's children. See supra Part HlI.B. 1.
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ceased. If the student's follow-up drug tests do not reveal drug use-and the
student has received counseling as dictated by school policy-then the student
should be allowed to return to extracurricular participation in good standing.
In the absence of these measures, suspicionless drug testing of extracurricular
participants stands as an empty symbol of school action to counter student drug
use, a symbol that is unlikely to prevent such use from continuing.
IV. CONCLUSION
During this term, the Supreme Court could decide whether students who
seek to participate in non-athletic extracurricular activities-such as Future
Farmers of America, the academic team, and the band-must submit to suspi-
cionless drug testing to be eligible. If it reaches the constitutional issue pre-
sented in Board of Education v. Earls, the Court will likely look to the reasoning
employed in two of its prior opinions-the 1995 decision in Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, in which the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing for
athletes in a school district with a significant drug problem exacerbated by ath-
lete drug use, and the 1999 decision in Chandler v. Miller, in which the Court
held that suspicionless drug testing of state political candidates was unconstitu-
tional-in ruling on the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Earls to strike down the
suspicionless drug testing program.
Moreover, the Court will likely consider the three elements presented in
Vernonia to analyze whether the drug test constitutes a reasonable search: the
nature of the privacy interest implicated by conducting suspicionless drug test-
ing on extracurricular participants, the character of the intrusion that accompa-
nies the urinalysis drug test, and the efficacy of the drug testing program in ad-
dressing the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue.220 Us-
ing these criteria, the Court will likely establish that the testing of athletes pre-
sents a constitutionally significant set of circumstances, one that simply is not
present in the testing of all students that engage in any form of extracurricular
activities. As such, the Court will likely find that the drug testing policy at issue
in Earls is unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional.
In the event that the Court does not strike down suspicionless drug testing
of extracurricular participants, state legislatures should act to curtail the occur-
rence of such testing within the public schools of their state. By preventing stu-
dents who test positive for drug use from engaging in extracurricular activities,
the school is not only failing to advance the goal of reducing student drug use by
providing the student with increased opportunities to engage in such use, but
also is not supporting any rehabilitative effort to help the student obtain treat-
220. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-66 (1995); see supra Part II.A.3.
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ment. Legislation at the state level could remedy this problem and provide
schools with guidance for implementing meaningful student drug prevention
measures.
